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Abstract
We analyze a group contest in which n groups compete to win a group-specific
public good prize. Group sizes can be different and any player may value the prize differently
within and across groups. Players exert costly efforts simultaneously and independently. Only
the highest effort (the best-shot) within each group represents the group effort that determines
the winning group. We fully characterize the set of equilibria and show that in any
equilibrium at most one player in each group exerts strictly positive effort. There always
exists an equilibrium in which only the highest value player in each active group exerts
strictly positive effort. However, perverse equilibria may exist in which the highest value
players completely free-ride on others by exerting no effort. We provide conditions under
which the set of equilibria can be restricted and discuss contest design implications.
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1. Introduction
Groups often confront each other in order to win a prize. Individual group members
contribute costly efforts to the ‘group effort’ which can increase the probability of winning by
their group. The prize can be of a public-good nature in the sense that every group member of
the winning group earns the prize even if he does not contribute to the group effort at all.
Examples of this setting include sports events between teams, rent-seeking contest between
lobbying groups, electoral confrontation, or war between coalitions.
Most studies on contests between groups use a perfect-substitutes group impact
function in which the efforts of the group members within a group are perfectly substitutable
and hence a group’s effort is determined by the sum of members’ efforts in that group.1
However, Lee (2012) analyzes a group contest with the weakest-link group impact function
where the efforts of the members within a group are perfectly complementary and thus the
minimum effort among the group members represents the group effort. Kolmar and
Rommeswinkel (2010) further study group contests employing a constant elasticity of
substitution group impact function, which allows the impact function of a group to become a
perfect-substitute type or a weakest-link type with different degree of complementarity
accordingly to the elasticity of substitution of efforts within the group. In the current paper
we study a group contest with a best-shot group impact function, where individual group
members exert costly efforts simultaneously and independently, but only the highest effort
within each group represents the group effort.

1

A function that translates the efforts of individual group members into the group effort is called a group
impact function. The literature on group contest originated with the work of Katz et al. (1990). Katz et al. use
symmetric players within each group, a perfect-substitutes group impact function (Bergstrom et al., 1986), and a
lottery contest success function (Tullock, 1980). Most follow-up studies on group contests use the perfectsubstitutes group impact function (Baik, 1993; Baik and Shogren, 1998; Baik et al., 2001; Baik, 2008; Münster,
2009). There is also a growing experimental literature examining contests between groups (Abbink et al., 2010;
Sheremeta and Zhang, 2010; Ahn et al., 2011; Sheremeta, 2011; Cason et al., 2012), for a review see Dechenaux
et al. (2012).
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Best-shot contests are readily observed in the field. Among sporting events, the
Fourball golf format in which a team performance is noted as the lowest score between the
two team members is a distinct example.2 In industrial organization, the case of competing
Research Joint Ventures (RJVs) can be a close example of the aforementioned setup. If an
RJV member can make a high quality innovation then it benefits the whole RJV, while other
lower quality innovations by other members of the same RJV get obsolete. Similar logic
applies to the case of patent pools competing for industry standards (e.g. 4G mobiles), where
the main patent (best-shot) provides most competing features of a particular patent pool. The
best-shot public good structure is also well documented and discussed in the defense
economics and system reliability literature (Conybeare et al., 1994; Varian, 2004).3 The
results show that in a defense or system reliability coalition, in the equilibrium the group
member with the highest valuation exerts strictly positive effort and the others free-ride by
exerting no effort. Our paper adds to this literature by introducing and characterizing the bestshot contest between groups. In contrast to the aforementioned literature, we show that, in
addition to the standard equilibrium where only ‘top guns’ fire, multiple equilibria in which
top guns do not fire may arise.
A behavioral background for the best-shot impact function is given in Baik and
Shogren (1998). Clark and Konrad (2007) and Deck and Sheremeta (2012) use a best-shot
impact function as the attack mechanism in the context of terrorism. Topolyan (2011) applies
the best-shot technology to portray extreme form of free-riding behavior in an all-pay auction
between two groups under symmetric valuations. Sheremeta (2011) uses the best-shot among
2

Cycling team events like Tour de France have some aspects of best-shot contests. Although each member of a
team participates separately in the contest, if any member of the team finishes first, then it records the win of the
whole team. Team archery or shooting contests have similar features in which literally the best-shot among the
team members determines the performance of the whole team.
3
Competing defense coalitions, such as the NATO and the Warsaw Pact, may follow the best-shot technology
in which the best performance of the coalition member determines the performance of the whole coalition
(Conybeare et al., 1994). The same story holds for inland security coalition comprised of different independent
bodies such as CIA and FBI, or in the context of system reliability (Varian, 2004).

3

other impact functions to experimentally investigate group contests, without general
theoretical analysis. However, none of the existing studies provide a thorough analysis of the
best-shot group contests.
We characterize the complete set of equilibria for the best-shot group contest and
show that in each equilibrium at most one player in each group exerts strictly positive effort,
whereas all the other players in the group free-ride by exerting no effort. Unlike Baik (1993,
2008), who finds that in the perfect-substitutes contest only the highest-valuation member in
each group exerts positive effort, in our best-shot contest the unique and active member in
each group is not always the highest-valuation member in that group. Specifically, there are
perverse equilibria in which a member whose valuation is not the highest within a group
exerts strictly positive effort, while other members in that group, including the highestvaluation member, free-ride by exerting no effort. These results are also different from the
ones by Lee (2012), who shows that in equilibrium of the weakest-link contest there is no
free-riding but there is a coordination problem due to the perfect complementarity of efforts
among the group members. In contrast, in our best-shot contest there is severe free-riding in
any equilibrium. Interestingly, the free-riders in each group may be the highest-valuation
players as well as other low-valuation players.
We also rank the possible equilibria in our model and show the conditions under
which perverse equilibria can be avoided from the perspective of a contest designer.
Therefore, our paper is also related to the paper by Kolmar and Wagener (2012), who
incorporate the contest mechanism into the public goods setting in order to solve two
efficiency failures: (1) insufficient provision of public goods (quantity problem) and (2)
unproductive players’ contributions to the public goods (sorting problem). They examine the
optimal structures of the CSF (contest success function) and prizes that solve these two
problems. Focusing on the sorting problem as in Kolmar and Wagener (2012), we specify the
4

structure of players’ valuations that prevents perverse equilibria, i.e., equilibria in which the
low-valuation players in each group exert positive efforts.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we present and in Section 3 we analyze
our best-shot contest model. In Section 4, as an example, we consider a contest with three
two-player groups. In Section 5, we discuss contest design implications and conclude by
suggesting avenues for future research. Technical proofs are in the Appendix.

2. The Model
Consider a contest in which
good prize. Group

2 groups compete to win a group-specific public1, 2, … ,

, where

is a set of groups, consists of

2

risk-neutral players who exert costly efforts to win the prize.
The individual group members’ valuation for the prize may differ within group and
across groups. This intra-group asymmetry in values can be a result of player asymmetry, but
it can also be interpreted as an exogenous sharing rule of the group-specific prize, in which
0 represent the

the prize-shares among the members of a group are different. Let
valuation for the prize of player

in group

1, and

for

. Without loss of generality, assume
1. Let

for

unit as the prize values, represent the effort level exerted by player
Next, we specify the group impact function as
effort of group

,

is given by

,…,

:

0, measured in the same
in group

.

, such that the group

. The following assumption defines

the best-shot technology:
Assumption 1: The group effort of group
exerted by the players in group

is represented by the maximum effort level
,

, i.e.,
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,…,

.

To specify the winning probability of group

,

, denote

,…,

:

0,1

as a contest success function (Münster, 2009). Assumption 2 specifies the regularity
.

conditions for

,

where

and

0,

1/ , ∑

0, 0, … , 0

Assumption 2:

0 for

1,

0,

0,

0,

. Furthermore,

0,

0 for some

0
0 , and

0.

We assume that all players forgo their efforts and they have a common cost function
as described by Assumption 3.
Assumption 3:
properties:

0

:

is the common cost function of effort with the following
0,

0,

0.

Only the members of the winning group receive the prize, while all other players
receive nothing. Let

represent the payoff for player

assumptions, the payoff for player

in group
,

in group

. Under the above

is
,…,

.

(1)

Equation (1) along with the three assumptions represents the best-shot group contest.
To close the structure we assume that all players in the contest choose their effort levels
independently and simultaneously, and that all of the above (including the valuations, group
compositions, impact functions, and the contest success function) is common knowledge.
We use the following definitions throughout the paper.
Definition 1: If player

in group

exerts strictly positive effort, i.e.,
0) the player is called inactive.

player is called active. Otherwise (when

6

0, then the

Definition 2: If at least one player in group
then group

0,

exerts strictly positive effort, i.e.,
0) the group is called inactive.

is called active. Otherwise (when

3. The Equilibria of the Game
We employ Nash equilibrium as our solution concept and begin by stating Lemma 1.
This lemma points out that there are always at least two groups that actively participate in a
best-shot contest.
Lemma 1: In any equilibrium at least two groups are active.
Assumption 1 gives rise to Lemma 2.
Lemma 2: In an equilibrium only one player in each group, if any, is active.
Next, let
where player

denote the best-response of player

is a unique player in group

in group

in a situation

. Lemma 3 follows.

Lemma 3: Given the effort levels of other groups,

1.

for

Lemmas 1 and 2 transform the game into a generalized version of an asymmetric
value individual contest, whereas Lemma 3 provides restrictions on the participation of the
players. A combination of the three lemmas gives Corollary 1 that we state without proof.
Corollary 1: An equilibrium in which player 1s in group 1 and 2 are active always exists.
0 for some

It follows from Lemma 3 that

and

0 for

, i.e., given the distribution of values, there can be instances in which the best response
for every player in a group is to exert no effort, as each of their valuation is low enough and
exerting any positive effort will result in a negative payoff.
The general nature of the current setup restricts us from finding closed form solution
for participation and equilibrium effort. To make the problem tractable and attain closed form
solutions we make the following restrictive assumptions. First, following the axiomatic
7

foundation of Münster (2009) we apply a logit (Tullock, 1980) form group contest success
function. Second, we use linear cost function with unit marginal cost.
Assumption 2': The probability of winning the prize for group

,

if ∑

∑

,…,

is
0

.
0

if ∑

Assumption 3': The common cost function is

.

Lemmas 1, 2 and 3 under these two assumptions convert the best-shot group contest
into a generalized asymmetric individual lottery contest in which each group behaves like an
individual contestant, but the valuation of the individual contestant may change depending on
which group member within a group is active. We use the results on asymmetric individual
contest by Stein (2002), who shows that in an

-player asymmetric contest some players

may not be active in an equilibrium. Using Proposition 1 of Stein (2002) we state the
condition in Lemma 4 for active participation in the contest.
Lemma 4: Suppose each player

1, 2, … ,

in group

1

1 is already active.

Then for at least one more player from any other group to be active, the following condition
∏

has to be satisfied:

∑

∏

,

.

Lemma 4 gives us a set of sufficient conditions to exclude one or more groups from
participating in the best-shot contest. This lemma also gives Corollary 2 that shows the
needed parametric restriction which, in turn, ensures participation of all the groups in an
equilibrium.
Corollary 2: If

∏
∑

∏

,

then, in an equilibrium, all

Based on Corollary 2, assume that first
where each player

in group

1, 2, … ,

groups are active in an equilibrium
is active, i.e.,
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groups are active.

∏
∑

∏

,

and

∏
∑

∏

. From Lemmas 1, 2, 3 and 4, one can expect that, under

,

certain restrictions, there exists an equilibrium in which player 1 (the highest-valuation player)
in each active group exerts strictly positive effort and the other group members free-ride by
1 for each active group . In such a case, each highest-

exerting no effort, i.e.,

valuation active player exerts the equilibrium effort in an

-player individual contest with

asymmetric values as in Stein (2002). It is easy to verify that this constitutes an equilibrium
as no player, exerting strictly positive or zero effort, has an incentive to deviate from the
effort level. This is summarized in Proposition 1.
∑

∏

and

,

groups are active. Define

i.e., only first
profile

∏

∏

Proposition 1: Suppose

, 0,

,0 ,

, 0,

,0 , … ,

∑

, 0,

,0 , 0,

∑

1
,0 , … , 0,

∏

1

∑

,0

,

,

. Then a
is a Nash

equilibrium of the best-shot group contest.
The implication of Proposition 1 is that in the equilibrium only one of the players
with the highest stake, or the most efficient player, exerts effort on behalf of the active group
and all other group members free-ride by exerting no effort.4 This particular equilibrium
indicates that in a market coalition such as an RJV or a defense coalition such as NATO, the
most efficient player does not benefit from being a member of the coalition, instead of
contesting as an individual player. Therefore, the equilibrium described by Proposition 1 does
not justify the inclusion of the most efficient player in a coalition formation due to the

4

This equilibrium is equivalent to the equilibrium in a group contest with perfect-substitutes impact function as
in Baik (1993). The equilibrium strategies are also similar to the equilibrium strategies in best-shot public good
games (Hirshleifer, 1983).
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exploitation of the great by the small (Olson, 1965), i.e., exploitation of the most efficient
players by other members.5
Coalition formation may be justified if there are perverse equilibria in which the most
efficient players can free-ride on other players’ efforts. Or, in other words, in those equilibria
the ‘top guns’ do not fire and there is exploitation of the small by the great. Proposition 2
shows that indeed perverse equilibria exist, justifying the existence of market, political and
international coalitions under best-shot technology.

Define

Then a profile

∑

1

∑

0,

, 0,

∏

∏

Proposition 2: Suppose

∏

1
, 0,

and

,

∑

1

where

∑

,0 , … , 0,

, 0,

, 0,

1

equilibrium of the best-shot group contest if

∏

1, 2, … ,

,0 , … , 0,

1

.

,

1

,0

.

is a Nash

∑

Proposition 2 fully characterizes the set of equilibria for the best-shot group contest.
This proposition shows that it is possible for a coalition to exist in which there is exploitation
of the small by the great, and in which the most efficient player can earn a higher payoff as an
inactive member of a group rather than contesting as an individual player. Nevertheless, the
final payoff of each player, including the most efficient players, crucially depends on the
equilibrium selection and the coordination between group members.
The rent dissipation results are very different in the current analysis compared to the
group contests with other group impact functions or the best-shot public good games. We
know that in the case of a perfect-substitutes impact function, the total rent dissipation is
5

One may argue, however, that the most efficient player may still be better off being a member of the coalition,
instead of contesting as an individual player, because it prevents the other members from exerting effort as
potential opponents.
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uniquely determined (Baik, 1993) and a coalition-proof equilibrium is unique in the case of a
weakest-link impact function (Lee, 2012). It is not trivial to fully rank the equilibria in the
best-shot case in terms of rent dissipation. The following corollary points out the highest and
the lowest possible rent dissipation in the best-shot group contest.
Corollary 3: The highest (lowest) possible equilibrium rent is dissipated for a given number
of active groups, when only the highest (lowest) value players in each active group exert
strictly positive effort. The rent dissipation is intermediate otherwise.

4. An Example with Three Two-Player Groups
To portray a simple diagrammatic explanation of our general results we consider an
example with three two-player groups, where there are three groups and each group consists
of two players. First, we show conditions for which one group becomes inactive and the
contest is reduced to a contest between two two-player groups. Then we characterize the set
of equilibria for this reduced form contest.
As shown in Lemmas 1 and 2, in any equilibrium at least two groups will be active
and only one player in each group will be active. One can show that there can be 20 equilibria
in which one player in each group is active and at least two groups are active. Now we
. From Lemma 4, this means that both members of group 3

impose condition

have relatively low valuations of the prize and active participation in the contest ensures loss
to them. Hence, both players in group 3 exert no effort and group 3 is always inactive. As a
result the set of equilibria reduces to only 4. Let us denote the equilibrium in which the player
from group 1 and the player
equilibria are

,

,

, and

from group 2 are active as
. Also, define
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. Then the four possible
1 and

1 .

The necessary restrictions on parameters and the resulting equilibria are summarized in Table
1 and are shown diagrammatically in Figure 1.
Table 1: Equilibrium Effort and Corresponding Condition (Two Active Groups).
Equilibrium

Equilibrium Conditions
0

0

0

0

0

No condition required

1

0

1

1
0

0
1

Figure 1: The Equilibria.

)
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,

As stated in Corollary 3, the rent dissipation is highest for

, lowest for

and

intermediate for the other two equilibria. This gives the flexibility to a contest designer not
only to select the equilibrium in terms of active players but also in terms of rent dissipation.
Depending on the distribution of values different equilibria may exist, and thus the designer
may want to impose certain restrictions to select a set of desirable equilibria. Figure 2
summarizes the required equilibrium conditions for
graph. Note that the equilibrium

,

,

, and

equilibria in

always exists in which ‘top guns’ fire.

However, there are six segments of the graph where, in addition to

, perverse equilibria

exist in which ‘top guns’ do not fire.
Figure 2: The Equilibria Conditions.

1
,
1

,

,
,

1

,
,

,
,

,
,

1
1

5. Discussion
In this paper we construct and analyze the best-shot group contest. We find that
depending on the distribution of values there can be multiple equilibria, but in each
13

equilibrium only one player from each group exerts strictly positive effort.6 This result is
robust to the number of groups, the number of players in each group, and the valuations of
players. However, the exact equilibrium strategies and rent dissipation are not uniquely
determined and are not robust.
We identify the conditions on the distribution of values that can give rise to multiple
equilibria. A contest designer may use such conditions to achieve a given objective. For
example, if individual values portray the within-group prize sharing rules, then based on the
fairness principle (Phillips, 1997) a designer can assign players to the groups such that most
efficient players always exert positive efforts. On the other hand, the objective of a designer
can be to either achieve the highest efficiency (Barr, 2004) or the lowest rent dissipation
(Tullock, 1980). In any case, the appropriate distribution of values can be selected to meet the
objective.
In the context of public goods and defense economics literature (Hirshleifer 1983,
1985; Bliss and Nalebuff, 1984; Harrison and Hirshleifer, 1989; Cornes, 1993) it has been
well recognized that using best-shot technology leads to equilibria in which the most able
players contribute to the public good. This result has been well known as the exploitation of
the great by the small (Olson, 1965), and it has been used to argue that it is difficult to sustain
market or defense coalitions because of the low incentives (or none) for efficient players to
join the coalition. The current study shows that, there may be scenarios where there is
exploitation of the small by the great, i.e., perverse equilibria in which ‘top guns’ do not fire
and the most efficient players free-ride on other players’ efforts. This result has important
implications, as it justifies coalition formation under the best-shot structure.

6

Multiple equilibria have also been documented in simple two-player lottery contests with spillovers
(Chowdhury and Sheremeta, 2011).
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The existence of multiple equilibria in the best-shot group contest also raises the issue
of equilibrium selection (Galeotti et al., 2010; Dall’Asta et al., 2011). As in the existing
literature, if one models the issues of system reliability or defense mechanisms in terms of
best-shot public good game, then a unique equilibrium ensures no equilibrium selection
concerns. However, if one models the aforementioned situations in a more realistic contest
setting, then the existence of multiple equilibria will affect the comparative statics results.
Hence, our findings reinforce the need for further research on equilibrium selection in
contests with best-shot impact functions. Even in the simplest case with two two-player
groups presented in Section 4, we show that depending on the distribution of the players’
valuations for the prize, the number of possible equilibria ranges from one to four.
Furthermore, if we consider the possibility of mixed strategies (i.e., when active players in
the same group have the same valuations), or pre-contest coordination strategies, then the
equilibrium selection becomes even more complicated. Refining the equilibria based on
different equilibrium selection criteria is an interesting avenue for the future research.
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Appendix

Proof of Lemma 1: Suppose there exists an equilibrium in which all the groups are inactive.
In such a case, the payoff of player
exerts an infinitesimal effort

in group

/ . Now, suppose player

is

in group

0 instead of being inactive. Then the payoff becomes

/ . Hence, all groups being inactive can never be an equilibrium. Now,
suppose there exists an equilibrium in which only group
equation (1), the payoff of player

in group

is 0. Now suppose player

in group

0 instead of being inactive, where

exerts an effort
against

is active. In such a case, from
in group

is the best response of player

in the two-player individual contest with CSF defined in Assumption
0. Thus, a single active group cannot

2. Consequently, the payoff becomes

constitute an equilibrium either. Hence in any equilibrium there are at least two active
groups.■

Proof of Lemma 2: Suppose in an equilibrium more than one player, say players
group

0. Hence, the payoff of player ,

exert strictly positive efforts with
,…,

under Assumption 1, is
it is always beneficial for player
,…,

,

,

and , in

,

,

,…,

. In such a case

to reduce effort to zero and increase payoff to:

,…,

. Hence, more than one player in the same group

exerting strictly positive effort cannot be an equilibrium.■

Proof of Lemma 3: Suppose that player
the best-response of player

in group

in group

is a unique player in the group. Then

is the non-negative effort level that maximizes its

18

(non-negative) payoff, given the effort levels of the players in the other groups. Specifically,
,…,

is the effort level that maximizes the payoff

0, where

,…,

is strictly concave, the solution
maximizing

,

and 3, ensure that

,

,…,

is unique, and satisfies the first-order condition for

/

. The first-order condition, jointly with Assumptions 2
is monotonically increasing in

, given

. Finally, this
1 implies that

for

0, … , 0 .■

for all

Proof of Lemma 4: By assumptions
1, when each player

1 of group

1, and

for
1,2, … ,

in group

1 is already active. If player

cannot earn positive payoff by exerting strictly positive effort, it is impossible

for any other player

,

in group

1, … ,

to earn positive payoff by being active.

Now, from Proposition 1 of Stein (2002) we know that when each player
1,2, … ,

,…,

. Since the payoff function

observation along with the assumption

for

,

0, and the participation constraint

subject to the non-negativity constraint
,

,

1 is active, then player 1 of group

positive payoff only if the condition

∑

∏

player 1 in group

is satisfied.■

,

Proof of Corollary 2: From Lemma 4, condition

0 and earn strictly

will exert

∏

in group

∏
∑

∏

ensures that at least

,

is always active in an equilibrium even when player 1s in all the other

groups are active. This, along with the assumption
that at least player 1 in group

for

1, means

is always active in an equilibrium when players other than

player 1s from all the other groups are active. Also, if it is participation compatible for player
19

1 in group

1 and the properties of

for

, then assumption

harmonic mean imply that it is participation compatible for player 1s in all the other
groups.■

Proof of Proposition 1: Note that
effort of player 1 in group

1

∑

1

is the equilibrium

∑

when the original contest is reduced to an

which consists of the highest-valuation players in groups 1, 2,
∏

conditions

∑

∏

and

,

∑

,0 ,

, 0,

,0 , … ,

, 0,

,0 , 0,

Proof of Proposition 2: Note that

∏

-player contest consisting of the
Hence, in

a profile

in group

0,

, 0,

,0 , … , 0,

1

∑

1 in group

equilibrium effort of player

player

. From Lemma 4, the
restrict only

,

groups to be active in an equilibrium. Hence, the following profile

the first
, 0,

∏

,

-player contest

,0

is an equilibrium.■

1

is the

∑

when the original contest is reduced to the

th highest-valuation players in each group
, 0,

,0 , … , 0,

, 0,

, 0,

,0 , … , 0,

.
,0

exerts strictly positive reduced-form-individual-contest effort and the

others in the group exert no effort. For this profile to be a Nash equilibrium, no player in the
contest should have an incentive to deviate from this profile. It is straightforward to show that
any player

1,

2, … ,

in group

does not have an incentive to deviate

according to Lemma 3.
Similarly, it is straightforward to show that player 1 in group
incentive, if any, to deviate from this profile because
20

has the highest

. This means that if player 1 in group
from this profile, then players 2, 3, …,

does not have an incentive to deviate

1 in group

do not have such incentives,

either. Therefore, in order to determine if this profile is an equilibrium, it is enough to check
if player 1 in each group

has any incentive to deviate from it.

Now we show the conditions under which player 1 in group
the profile

0,

, 0,

, 0,

profile, player 1 in group
1

1

1

1

∑

,0 , … , 0,

,0 , … , 0,

,0

. Under this

. Hence, the payoff of player 1 in group

∑

is

is

.

∑

deviates from the profile, his optimal effort level is
∑

∑

1

∑

. However, by deviating from the profile, this player

∑

1

earns the payoff
Then, for player 1 in group

1

∑

not to deviate from the profile, we need
2

∑

rewritten as

, 0,

exerts no effort, and the winning probability of group

If player 1 in group

∑

, 0,

does not deviate from

1

1

∑

21

∑

.
, i.e.,

0. The inequality can be

∑

1

1

∑

1

0,

1

1

, 0,

, 0,

,0 , … , 0,

1

,

∑

, 0,

1

1

∑

∑

∏
∑

∏

,0 , … , 0,

the

,0

following

profile

is a Nash equilibrium if

.■

∑

∑

∑

. Differentiating with respect to the value of an active player

∏

∑

, 0,

∑

equilibrium rent dissipation is ∑

∏

Therefore,

groups are active. From Proposition 2, the total

Proof of Corollary 3: Suppose

1

0.

∑

∏

∑

∏

∏

∏

∑

∏

∏

∑

∏
,

∑

∏

∏

we get

,

0 , i.e.,

the total rent dissipation is monotonically increasing in the values of the active players.
Hence, the equilibrium in which only the highest valuation player in each group exerts
positive effort results in the highest rent dissipation among the set of equilibria of the bestshot group contest. Following the same logic, the equilibrium in which only the lowest
valuation player in each group exerts positive effort, dissipates the lowest rent and the
intermediate cases will result in intermediate rent dissipation and the ranking will depend on
the distribution of values within and between groups.■
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